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Although inattention is a key symptom subdomain of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), the mechanisms underlying this subdomain and related symptoms remain unclear. There is a need for more granular approaches that allow for greater specificity in linking disruptions in specific domains of cognitive performance (e.g., executive function and reward processing) with behavioral manifestations of ADHD. Such approaches may inform the development of more targeted therapeutic interventions. Here, we describe the results of a pilot study of elementary-aged children (ages 6–12years) with ADHD ( n =50) and typically developing children ( n =48) utilizing a cognitive science task designed to target two dissociable mechanisms of attentional selection: a goal-driven mechanism (i.e., reward/value-driven) and a salience-driven mechanism. Participants were asked to optimally extract and combine information about stimulus salience and value to maximize rewards. While results of this pilot study are ambiguous due to the small sample size and limited number of task trials, data suggest that neither participants with ADHD nor typically developing participants performed optimally to maximize rewards, though typically developing participants were somewhat more successful at the task (i.e., more likely to report high-value targets) regardless of task condition. Further, the manuscript examines several follow-up questions regarding group differences in task response times and group differences in task performance as related to sustained attention across the duration of the task. Finally, the manuscript examines follow-up questions related to heterogeneity in the ADHD group (i.e., age, DSM 5 presentation, and comorbid diagnosis) in predicting task performance. 

According to the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, people can truly know something only if they have a belief that is both justified and true (i.e., knowledge is JTB). This account was challenged by Gettier, who argued that JTB does not explain knowledge attributions in certain situations, later called “Gettier-type cases,” wherein protagonists are justified in believing something to be true, but their belief was correct only because of luck. Laypeople may not attribute knowledge to protagonists with justified but only luckily true beliefs. Although some research has found evidence for these so-called Gettier intuitions, Turri et al. found no evidence that participants attributed knowledge in a counterfeit-object Gettier-type case differently than in a matched case of JTB. In a large-scale, cross-cultural conceptual replication of Turri and colleagues’ Experiment 1 ( N = 4,724) using a within-participants design and three vignettes across 19 geopolitical regions, we did find evidence for Gettier intuitions; participants were 1.86 times more likely to attribute knowledge to protagonists in standard cases of JTB than to protagonists in Gettier-type cases. These results suggest that Gettier intuitions may be detectable across different scenarios and cultural contexts. However, the size of the Gettier intuition effect did vary by vignette, and the Turri et al. vignette produced the smallest effect, which was similar in size to that observed in the original study. Differences across vignettes suggest that epistemic intuitions may also depend on contextual factors unrelated to the criteria of knowledge, such as the characteristics of the protagonist being evaluated.